AI Evaluates a Claim that a Departure from the LXX Allowed Enlightenment Philosophers to Undermine Christianity
by Stuart DiNenno
The following begins with a verbatim transcript of a 28 part thread posted on Twitter (X) by someone with the user name Johnny Rider.
His argument claims that the Greek texts of Jerome’s time (342–420 A.D.), which the author identifies as the Septuagint (LXX), preserve an authoritative and precise conceptual framework for key theological terms (especially δικαιοσύνη), and that Jerome, by departing from this framework when translating the Latin Vulgate—most notably by using aequitas where iustitia is argued to be the correct equivalent—introduced a category error that shifted the meaning of the word from a virtue (righteousness/justice as a quality of character and right standing) to a more procedural or egalitarian idea of fairness.
This shift is then said to have altered the conceptual vocabulary available in the Latin West.
As a result, the argument concludes, this change created the conditions in which later Enlightenment thinkers could develop ideas such as equality, natural rights, and social contract theory in ways that departed from the original biblical framework.
The original thread can be found at the link below. All text contained within images on the Twitter page has been converted into plain text on this page.
https://x.com/jrser31/status/2025102603688845356
Since the author himself used an AI assessment in point #18 (‘the AI assessment is brutal’), I thought it appropriate to post a ChatGPT assessment of his entire argument at the bottom of this page, which I believe accurately represents the faulty reasoning in the argument.
The Author’s Argument
The Seeds of the Enlightenment: Jerome’s choice of aequitas instead of iustitia in his Latin translation created the semantic foundations that the Enlightenment was built upon. Égalité / Équité developed from the Vulgate but not from God’s Word. /1
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Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Siculus considered justice (Dikaiosune) the queen of virtues in civic life. Dikē the older root. Homer: “For it is not the δίκη of mortals proudly to mistreat a host.” Plato’s Gorgias portrays Dikē as the cosmic principle binding heaven and earth. /2
I. The Primary Term: Δικαιοσύνη (Dikaiosunē)
Definition and Semantic Range
Δικαιοσύνη is the abstract noun denoting the quality possessed by one who is δίκαιος (dikaios)—that is, “just,” “righteous,” “upright,” or “observant of what is due.” Formed with the suffix -σύνη (which creates abstracts of quality or condition, as in σωφροσύνη from σώφρων), the word signifies:
1. The virtue of justice as a settled disposition of character
2. Uprightness in one’s dealings with others
3. The observance of what is right according to law, custom, and moral propriety
4. Fair dealing in contracts, obligations, and social relations
To the Greek mind of the classical and Hellenistic periods, δικαιοσύνη was not merely a legalistic concept but a comprehensive moral and social virtue—indeed, for Plato and his successors, it was arguably the architectonic virtue that ordered the others.
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δικαιοσύνη is the harmony of parts, whether of the soul (where reason rules, spirit aids, and appetite obeys) or of the city (where each class performs proper function). Not merely refraining from injuring; it is the positive excellence of proper internal and external order. /3
IV. How a Secular Greek Understood Δικαιοσύνη
For a Greek man of education between 250 BC and 100 AD—steeped in the philosophical schools and the civic institutions of the πόλις or the Hellenistic kingdoms—δικαιοσύνη would have evoked a constellation of ideas: /3
A. The Platonic Conception
From the Republic, one learned that δικαιοσύνη is the harmony of parts, whether of the soul (where reason rules, spirit aids, and appetite obeys) or of the city (where each class performs its proper function). It is not merely refraining from injuring others; it is the positive excellence of proper internal and external ordering.
B. The Aristotelian Analysis
From the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, one learned the crucial distinction:
• General justice (ἡ ὅλη δικαιοσύνη): the sum of virtue as exercised toward the community—“the lawful is the just” in this sense
• Particular justice: the specific virtue concerned with fairness in:
• Distribution (διανεμητική δικαιοσύνη): giving honours, goods, and offices according to merit (κατ’ ἀξίαν)
• Rectification (διορθωτική δικαιοσύνη): restoring equilibrium after wrongful transactions, whether voluntary (contracts) or involuntary (theft, assault)
Aristotle’s formula—to ἴσον (“the equal” or “the fair”)—lies at the heart of particular justice.
C. The Stoic View
The Stoics (Zeno, Chrysippus, and their successors) taught that δικαιοσύνη was one of the four cardinal virtues (alongside φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, and ἀνδρεία). They defined it as:
ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητική τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ
“The knowledge that apportions to each his worth/due.”
For the Stoics, the wise man (σοφός) alone possesses true δικαιοσύνη, since only he knows what is genuinely due to each person according to nature and reason.
D. The Civic and Popular Sense
Beyond the philosophical schools, the ordinary Greek understood δικαιοσύνη as:
• Honesty in commercial dealings
• Reliability in fulfilling contracts and oaths
• Respect for law (νόμος) and for ancestral custom
• Fair treatment of family, friends, fellow-citizens, and strangers
• Not grasping more than one’s share (avoiding πλεονεξία, the vice opposed to justice)
Inscriptions praising benefactors routinely commend their δικαιοσύνη alongside φιλοτιμία (public-spiritedness) and εὐσέβεια (piety toward the gods).
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Roman and bilingual translators used iustitia as the direct equivalent of δικαιοσύνη. /4
V. The Relationship to Latin Iustitia
When Roman translators and bilingual writers rendered Greek philosophical and historical texts into Latin, they consistently chose iustitia for δικαιοσύνη. As perseus.tufts.edu records in Lewis and Short’s lexicon, Cicero defines iustitia in terms drawn directly from Greek philosophy:
“quae animi affectio suum cuique tribuens, atque hanc quam dico, societatem conjunctionis humanae munifice et aeque tuens, iustitia dicitur”
(De Finibus V.23.65)
“That disposition of mind which renders to each his own, and which generously and equitably maintains that fellowship of human association of which I speak—this is called iustitia.”
This is pure Greek ethics in Roman dress: the phrase suum cuique tribuens (“rendering to each his own”) translates the Greek formula τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ ἀπονέμειν.
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In the LXX, the inspired translators used the word δικαιοσύνη 257 times in 250 verses. It was by far the dominant term. Some examples: /5
Exemplary Instances from the Septuagint
Let me present several notable passages where the Greek translators employed this term, along with the Greek text and my analysis of what an ordinary educated Greek speaker would have understood:
1. Genesis 15:6 (LXX)
καὶ ἐπίστευσεν Αβραμ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην
“And Abram believed God, and it was reckoned to him for δικαιοσύνη.”
From a purely Greek standpoint, this is a striking expression. The verb λογίζομαι (logizomai) is common commercial and philosophical vocabulary—it means “to reckon,” “to calculate,” “to account.” We find it in Aristotle’s discussions of practical reasoning and in banking documents from the papyri. The phrase εἰς δικαιοσύνην (“unto/for δικαιοσύνη”) would have suggested to a Greek reader that the subject’s trust or confidence (πίστις, pistis) was credited to his account, as it were, as constituting uprightness of character.
2. Genesis 18:19 (LXX)
The Greek speaks of “doing δικαιοσύνην and κρίσιν” (judgment/decision). This pairing of δικαιοσύνη with κρίσις (judgment) would be immediately intelligible to a Greek: it echoes the Platonic – Aristotelian pairing of the just disposition and the judicial act.
3. Exodus 15:13 (LXX)
ὡδήγησας τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σου τὸν λαόν σου τοῦτον ὃν ἐλυτρώσω
“You led by your δικαιοσύνη this people of yours whom you ransomed.”
To a Greek reader, the idea of a deity “leading” (ὁδηγέω) a people by his “δικαιοσύνη” would evoke the philosophical notion that justice is a guiding principle—reminiscent of Plato’s assertion that δικαιοσύνη orders both the soul and the city.
4. Psalm 4:2 (LXX numbering: 4:2)
ἐν τῷ ἐπικαλεῖσθαί με εἰσήκουσέν μου ὁ θεὸς τῆς δικαιοσύνης μου
“When I called upon him, the god of my δικαιοσύνη heard me.”
The genitive construction “ὁ θεὸς τῆς δικαιοσύνης μου” is curious from a secular Greek standpoint. One might render it as “the god who is the source/guardian of my righteousness” or “the god who vindicates me.” A Greek philosopher might compare this to the role assigned to Zeus as guardian of δίκη in Hesiod.
5. Psalm 5:9 (LXX: 5:9)
κύριε ὁδήγησόν με ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ σου
“Lord, lead me in your δικαιοσύνη.”
Again, the guiding function of δικαιοσύνη is prominent—one is led in or by this quality, as if it were a path or principle of right order.
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The LXX translators juxtaposed compassionate disposition with δικαιοσύνη. Righteousness as something one does rather than simply has. Dikaiosunē is done by practice. /6
II. A Secondary Term: Ἐλεημοσύνη (Eleēmosunē)
This word presents a fascinating case of semantic shift when transported from secular Greek into this Alexandrian translation.
Secular Greek Meaning
Ἐλεημοσύνη derives from ἐλεήμων (pitiful, merciful), which in turn comes from ἔλεος (pity, compassion). In classical Greek, ἐλεημοσύνη denotes “mercy, pity”—a compassionate disposition toward those who suffer. We find this sense in Callimachus (the Alexandrian poet of the 3rd century BC) and elsewhere.
However, the Greek word ἐλεημοσύνη (eleēmosunē) occurs 18 times in 18 verses in the LXX Greek.
Usage in the LXX
In the Septuagint, ἐλεημοσύνη is employed for underlying oriental words meaning both “lovingkindness” and “righteousness,” exhibiting a semantic overlap that would have been strange to a purely secular Greek reader.
The phrase ποιεῖν ἐλεημοσύνην (“to practise ἐλεημοσύνη”) appears alongside similar phrases such as δικαιοσύνην ποιεῖν and ἀλήθειαν ποιεῖν.
This is striking: in secular Greek, one would naturally say δικαιοσύνην ἔχειν (to possess righteousness) or δικαιοσύνην ἀσκεῖν (to practise/exercise righteousness), but the construction with ποιεῖν (to do, to make) suggests a more active, deed-oriented understanding—righteousness as something one does rather than simply has.
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The LXX translators intentionally avoided a horizontal connotation. Recall that there is no word for ‘covenant’ in the inspired LXX. /7
I. The Significance of Διαθήκη as the Governing Concept
As the web sources confirm, the secular Greek usage of διαθήκη is overwhelmingly testamentary:
“By far the most common use of διαθήκη in the extant Greek literature is not a ‘covenant’ in the Old Testament sense… but a written document drawn up to distribute property after a person’s death, a ‘disposition’, ‘testament’ or ‘will’.” (lionelwindsor.net)
The legal vocabulary surrounding διαθήκη in secular Greek includes:
• διατίθεμαι (diatithēmi): to make a disposition, to draw up a will (Isaeus, On the Estate of Cleonymus 3, 11, 15, 20, 48)
• καταλείπω (kataleipō): to leave behind (as inheritance) (Isocrates, Aegineticus 5, 15, 34)
• βεβαιόω (bebaioō): to confirm, ratify a will (Isaeus, Cleonymus 18–19)
• κληρονόμος (klēronomos): heir, one who receives by lot or inheritance
• κληρονομία (klēronomia): inheritance, the portion received
If a Greek reader of the 3rd–2nd century BC encountered the Septuagint’s διαθήκη, he would naturally understand it as:
1. A unilateral disposition made by a superior party (the one disposing)
2. An arrangement concerning inheritance and the bestowal of goods, land, or status
3. Something irrevocable once the disposer has died, but potentially modifiable while the disposer lives
4. Not a negotiated agreement between equals, but a gracious grant from one who possesses to those whom he favours
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Dikaiosunē possession and exercise: benefactor keeping his word/his honor, and a grateful beneficiary responding with worthy conduct. /8
A. The Righteousness of the Testator/Disposer
When the deity is said to possess or exercise δικαιοσύνη, a Greek reader would understand this as:
• The rectitude with which the disposer administers his estate
• The just and proper ordering of his bequests
• The faithfulness to his own declared intentions in the disposition
• The integrity of one who honours his own διαθήκη
This is not “covenant faithfulness” in any bilateral sense—it is rather the honour of a benefactor who keeps his word regarding what he has promised to bestow.
B. The Righteousness Reckoned to Beneficiaries
Consider again Genesis 15:6 (LXX):
καὶ ἐπίστευσεν Αβραμ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην
“And Abram trusted God, and it was reckoned to him as δικαιοσύνη.”
Within a testamentary framework, this reads as follows: the benefactor (the deity) has made a διαθήκη—a disposition concerning inheritance (land, descendants, blessing). Abram’s response is πίστις (trust, confidence, faith)—he accepts the terms of the disposition as reliable. This trust is then “reckoned” (λογίζομαι—a commercial/accounting term) to him as constituting his standing as a righteous heir.
In Greek testamentary law, an heir must be worthy (ἄξιος) to receive. One who trusts the testator’s word and accepts the disposition is, by that very acceptance, placed in right relation to the inheritance. His δικαιοσύνη is not earned by works of contractual obligation but credited to him as befits one who stands in proper relation to the benefactor’s will.
C. Doing Δικαιοσύνη as Proper Conduct of an Heir
When texts speak of “doing δικαιοσύνη” (δικαιοσύνην ποιεῖν), a Greek reader within this framework would understand:
• Conducting oneself worthily of the inheritance received
• Acting in accordance with the terms and spirit of the disposition
• Living as befits one who has been graciously included in the testator’s arrangement
This is not the fulfilment of bilateral contractual terms but rather the fitting conduct of a grateful beneficiary.
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It is all unilateral grace and humble thankfulness: /9
If ἐλεημοσύνη is understood within this testamentary context, it signifies:
A. The Benefactor’s Charitable Distribution
When the deity is said to “do ἐλεημοσύνη” (ποιεῖν ἐλεημοσύνας), a Greek reader would understand:
• Acts of merciful bestowal—giving to those who have no claim
• Gracious distribution of goods from one who has abundance
• The charitable disposition characteristic of a generous patron
This is the behaviour of a wealthy testator who includes in his will not only his natural heirs but also freedmen, dependants, and those bound to him by no legal obligation—purely from magnanimity.
B. The Heir’s Imitation of the Benefactor
When human beings are exhorted to “do ἐλεημοσύνη,” the sense would be:
• To imitate the generous disposition of the great benefactor
• To distribute charitably from what one has received
• To extend to others the same unmerited favour one has received from the testator
The heir who has received by grace is called to bestow by grace.
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For a Greek reader, he heard and understood Dikaiosunē in the LXX as follows: /10
Let me now present the entire semantic field as a Greek reader would have understood it, stripped of any bilateral “covenant” notion:
Greek Term — Meaning within Testamentary Framework
διαθήκη — A unilateral disposition; a will; an inheritance arrangement made by a benefactor
δικαιοσύνη — The righteousness/integrity of the disposer in honouring his will; the right standing of an heir who trusts the disposition
ἔλεος — The compassion/mercy that moves the benefactor to include the undeserving in his bequest
ἐλεημοσύνη — Acts of merciful giving; charitable distribution; generous bestowal
πίστις — Trust in the benefactor’s word; confidence that the disposition will be honoured
κληρονομία — The inheritance itself; what is bequeathed
κληρονόμος — The heir; the recipient of the bequest
ἐπαγγελία — A promise; the declared intention of the testator regarding his disposition
VI. Illustrative Passages Reread
Genesis 15:6 (LXX)
καὶ ἐπίστευσεν Αβραμ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην
Translation within testamentary framework:
“And Abram put his trust in God, and it was credited to his account as righteousness.”
Sense: The great Benefactor has announced a disposition (διαθήκη) concerning land and descendants. Abram responds with πίστις—he believes the Benefactor will honour his word. This trusting acceptance is reckoned to him as the right standing of a worthy heir. He has not earned the inheritance; he has trusted the Testator.
Psalm 102:17 (LXX)
τὸ δὲ ἔλεος τοῦ κυρίου ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος καὶ ἕως τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐπὶ τοὺς φοβουμένους αὐτὸν καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ υἱοὺς υἱῶν
“But the ἔλεος of the Lord is from age to age upon those who fear him, and his δικαιοσύνη upon their children’s children.”
Translation within testamentary framework:
“But the Lord’s compassionate favour endures from generation to generation toward those who reverence him, and his righteous fidelity extends to their children’s children.”
Sense: The Benefactor’s compassion (ἔλεος) and his righteous integrity (δικαιοσύνη) in honouring his disposition are transgenerational—they extend to the heirs of the heirs. This is not bilateral obligation; it is the enduring character of a faithful Testator who ensures his bequest passes to successive generations.
Psalm 32:5 (LXX)
ἀγαπᾷ ἐλεημοσύνην καὶ κρίσιν τοῦ ἐλέους κυρίου πλήρης ἡ γῆ
“He loves merciful giving and just judgment; of the Lord’s compassion the earth is full.”
Sense: The deity delights in ἐλεημοσύνη (charitable bestowal) and κρίσις (right judgment in distribution). His ἔλεος (compassionate favour) fills the earth—his generosity extends to all creation, not as contractual obligation but as the overflow of a magnanimous Patron.
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Jerome destroyed this clearly inspired meaning. He disregarded the plain choices in the LXX, and instead pursuing ‘ad fontes’ went to the alien rabbis of his day. They persuaded him of a ‘deeper’ meaning. So he, acting on his own judgment, decided to substitute Aequitas. /11
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How an educated Roman would have understood Aequitas: note that it is much broader and more horizontal in its primary sense, just like ‘covenant’. /12
A. Primary Meanings
According to Lewis and Short’s Latin Dictionary, aequitas denotes in its primary sense “the uniform relation of one thing to others, equality, conformity, symmetry.” The root is aequus (level, even, equal).
In its ethical and juridical sense, aequitas signifies “just or equitable conduct toward others, justice, equity, fairness”—but it is explicitly glossed as corresponding to the Greek ἐπιείκεια (epieikeia), with the crucial qualification that it is “governed by benevolence, while iustitia yields to another only what is strictly due.”
This distinction is critical: Cicero himself in De Oratore presents arguments “pro aequitate contra ius”—“in favour of equity and against strict law.”
B. Aequitas as Corrective, Not Cardinal Virtue
In Roman legal understanding, aequitas “embodies the idea of fairness, reasonableness, and conscience, particularly when the strict application of a legal rule or statute might lead to an unjust, unduly harsh, or absurd outcome. Essentially, aequitas allows for the spirit of the law, or a sense of what is inherently right, to temper the rigidity of formal legal rules.”
Aequitas emerged as a response to the rigid application of law, allowing judges to consider equitable principles when making decisions. Roman jurists used aequitas to interpret laws, creating a balance between strict adherence to rules and the need for just outcomes.
C. The Secondary Meaning: Equanimity
Aequitas also signifies “a quiet, tranquil state of mind, evenness of temper, moderation, calmness, tranquillity, repose, equanimity.”
This psychological meaning has no parallel whatsoever in the Greek δικαιοσύνη.
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Jerome committed a fundamental category error: to translate δικαιοσύνη as aequitas is to substitute the corrective for the virtue corrected /13
Here is the decisive philological point. The Latin lexicographers are explicit: aequitas corresponds to Greek ἐπιείκεια (epieikeia), “governed by benevolence, while iustitia yields to another only what is strictly due.”
What is Ἐπιείκεια in Greek?
In Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics V.10 (1137a–1138a), ἐπιείκεια is discussed at length as a correction of strict legal justice (τὸ δίκαιον τὸ νομικόν). Aristotle writes:
τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικές δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου.
“The equitable is just, but not the legally just—rather, it is a correction of legal justice.”
Ἐπιείκεια is thus:
• A supplement to δικαιοσύνη, not a synonym
• Concerned with particular cases where strict law fails
• Responsive to circumstances rather than establishing character
• A procedural corrective, not the cardinal virtue itself
The Implication
If aequitas corresponds to ἐπιείκεια, then to translate δικαιοσύνη as aequitas is to substitute the corrective for the virtue corrected—a fundamental category error.
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Jerome destroyed the meaning of multiple passages of Scripture by substituting aequitas instead of the natural meaning iustitia for Dikaiosunē. He collapsed the hierarchy into a flat abstraction. /14
Let me now enumerate the specific semantic losses and distortions that occur when this substitution is made.
A. Loss of the Cardinal Virtue Concept
Δικαιοσύνη in Greek (and iustitia in proper Latin philosophical usage) is one of the four cardinal virtues—alongside σωφροσύνη (temperance), ἀνδρεία (courage), and φρόνησις (prudence). It is a settled excellence of the soul, the architectonic virtue that orders all others.
Aequitas is not a cardinal virtue. It is a procedural principle, a corrective measure, a quality of equitable dealing. As personified, Aequitas “represented the ideal of impartiality and equality in legal and social matters”—but this is not the same as the comprehensive virtue of character that δικαιοσύνη denotes.
Loss: The Latin reader loses the sense that he is reading about a fundamental excellence of the human soul.
B. Reduction from Character to Procedure
Δικαιοσύνη is a ἕξις (hexis)—a stable disposition of character that issues in just actions. It is who one is, not merely what one does.
Aequitas is more concerned with process and outcome—achieving fair results in particular cases. Aequitas “influenced judicial decisions in ancient Rome by allowing judges to interpret laws with an eye towards fairness rather than strictly adhering to legal codes. This flexibility meant that judges could consider individual circumstances and societal norms when rendering verdicts.”
Loss: The Latin reader perceives a procedural concept (how to adjudicate fairly) rather than a characterological concept (how to be a just person).
C. From Architectonic Order to Situational Balance
In Plato’s Republic, δικαιοσύνη is the harmony of the soul’s parts—reason ruling, spirit aiding, appetite obeying. It is the principle of cosmic and psychic order.
Aequitas, by contrast, evokes the balance scale (libra). Aequitas “was often depicted holding a balance scale, symbolizing the careful weighing of evidence and arguments in legal proceedings to arrive at a just decision.”
Loss: The Latin reader sees a commercial/juridical image of weighing and balancing, not the philosophical concept of harmonious order. The great Platonic–Stoic vision of justice as cosmic principle is reduced to marketplace calibration.
D. Loss of the Testamentary Framework We Established
Within the LXX, we established that δικαιοσύνη functions in a testamentary context (governed by διαθήκη):
• The integrity of the Benefactor who honours his disposition
• The right standing of the heir who trusts the Testator
• The reckoning of trust as δικαιοσύνη (Genesis 15:6)
Aequitas cannot bear this semantic weight. It speaks of equal treatment, fair process, balanced outcomes—none of which capture:
• The asymmetric relationship of Testator to beneficiary
• The imputation of righteousness to the trusting heir
• The faithfulness of the great Patron to his own declared will
Loss: The entire testamentary-inheritance structure collapses into a flattened juridical concept.
E. From Relational Righteousness to Abstract Fairness
Δικαιοσύνη in the LXX is relational—it exists between the Benefactor and those he has chosen to favour. It is the integrity of one who keeps his word, the standing of one who trusts.
Aequitas is more abstract—it concerns the principle of fairness irrespective of personal relationship. Aequitas “is based on natural law (ius naturale) and signifies the primordial order, natural and obvious to everyone. Its main feature is equality of all people.”
Loss: The Latin reader substitutes an abstract principle of universal equality for the concrete relational reality of a Benefactor’s faithfulness to his chosen heirs.
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Readers of the Vulgate developed distorted frameworks: Aequitas’s “main feature is equality of all people.” LXX’s shows δικαιοσύνη as something graciously credited to those who trust—not earned by works, not owed by nature, but reckoned by the Benefactor’s generosity. /15
If a translator systematically renders δικαιοσύνη as aequitas, the Latin reader’s understanding is deformed in the following ways:
A. Judicial Rather Than Characterological Framework
The reader will approach the text as concerned with fair procedure and equal treatment rather than with moral excellence and right standing before a Benefactor. He will think like a praetor adjudicating cases, not like a philosopher contemplating virtue or an heir contemplating his Testator.
B. Horizontal Rather Than Vertical Orientation
Aequitas suggests relations among equals—the level playing field, the balanced scale, the impartial arbiter. The reader will miss the vertical asymmetry of the LXX’s testamentary framework, where the great Patron graciously includes the undeserving in his disposition, and the beneficiary’s δικαιοσύνη is received, not achieved.
C. Merit-Blind Rather Than Grace-Structured
Aequitas’s “main feature is equality of all people.” This egalitarian emphasis obscures the LXX’s portrait of δικαιοσύνη as something graciously credited to those who trust—not earned by works, not owed by nature, but reckoned by the Benefactor’s generosity.
The Latin reader will think: “fairness demands equal treatment for all.”
The Greek text says: “the Benefactor’s righteousness is shown in his faithful bestowal of what he freely willed to give.”
D. Loss of Eleos–Dikaiosunē Pairing
In the LXX, ἔλεος (compassion) and δικαιοσύνη (righteousness) are frequently paired. This pairing makes sense within the testamentary framework:
• Ἔλεος: the Benefactor’s compassionate motive in making the disposition
• Δικαιοσύνη: the Benefactor’s integrity in honouring it
If δικαιοσύνη becomes aequitas, the pairing loses coherence. Aequitas already contains connotations of lenity and flexibility; to pair it with misericordia (mercy) is redundant. The distinctive structure—compassion motivates, righteousness executes—collapses.
E. The “Reckoning” of Righteousness Becomes Unintelligible
Consider Genesis 15:6 (LXX):
καὶ ἐπίστευσεν Αβραμ τῷ θεῷ καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην
If rendered into Latin as:
et credidit Abram Deo et reputatum est illi ad aequitatem
—the Latin reader confronts absurdity. How can trust be “reckoned as fairness”? Aequitas is a principle of procedure, not a standing that can be credited to a person’s account.
The proper Latin:
et credidit Abram Deo et reputatum est illi ad iustitiam
—makes immediate sense: trusting the Benefactor’s word is reckoned to him as righteousness, as the proper standing of an heir.
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Aequitas cannot be imputed. Translating with aequitas substitutes a subordinate concept for the cardinal virtue. It replaces character with procedure. Flattens the asymmetric into horizontal egalitarianism. And thus we get the Endarkenment. /16
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The Greek equivalent of ‘aequitas’ is not found in a single verse of the LXX, except for Psalm 85:5 and Esther 3:13. Psalm 85 is listing the character qualities of God, and thus ἐπιεικής is used to show God possesses reasonable forbearance and rich mercy towards men. /17
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The divine translators were not mistaken. They never confused or conflated these two Greek concepts, just as they never conflated ‘covenant’ with ‘testament’. The AI assessment is brutal: /18
C. Ἐπιείκεια Is Never Used Where Δικαιοσύνη Appears
This is the critical observation. The translators did not confuse or conflate these terms. When they wished to speak of righteousness, uprightness, the cardinal virtue, they used δικαιοσύνη. When they wished to speak of clemency, moderation, equitable forbearance, they used ἐπιείκεια.
The two words occupy distinct semantic positions:
Δικαιοσύνη — Ἐπιείκεια
Cardinal virtue — Corrective of strict justice
Character excellence — Governing style
Righteousness in itself — Forbearance toward others
Can be credited/reckoned — Exercised in particular cases
The standard — The merciful deviation from the standard
D. Confirmation of Our Earlier Analysis
This evidence confirms that a translator who renders δικαιοσύνη as Latin aequitas commits a category error. The LXX translators themselves possessed ἐπιείκεια in their vocabulary and used it appropriately—in contexts of clemency, royal moderation, and forbearing governance. They did not use it where δικαιοσύνη was called for.
If they had considered the two terms interchangeable, we would expect to find ἐπιείκεια in passages like Genesis 15:6, or in the Psalms’ declarations of divine righteousness. We do not. The semantic distinction was clear to them, as it should be to any responsible translator.
Jerome may have inspired the slogan of the philosophes: Liberté Égalité Fraternité with his alteration of Proverbs. Today most Bibles read: “to receive instruction in wise dealing, in righteousness, justice, and equity,” but the original Greek is not so. /19
Latin Vulgate:
ad intelligendam iustitiam et iudicium et aequitatem et omnem semitam bonam.
Greek LXX:
δέξασθαι τε στροφὰς λόγων νοῆσαί τε δικαιοσύνην ἀληθῆ καὶ κρίμα κατευθύνειν.
This is interesting. The Greek speaks of δικαιοσύνην ἀληθῆ (“true righteousness”) and κρίμα (“judgment”). Jerome expands this into a triad: iustitia, iudicium, and aequitas. The aequitas appears to be an addition not directly corresponding to any single Greek term—perhaps an interpretive expansion to capture the full semantic range, or perhaps a stylistic flourish.
Evaluation: This introduces vocabulary not strictly warranted by the Greek text.
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Augustine warned Jerome against his bad translation practices: /20
Jerome famously articulated his translation philosophy as rendering sense for sense (sensum de sensu) rather than word for word (verbum e verbo), except where theological precision demanded literalism.
As noted in the correspondence between Augustine and Jerome (bible-researcher.com), Augustine expressed concern about Jerome’s departures from the established Septuagint-based translations:
“I beseech you not to devote your labour to the work of translating into Latin the sacred canonical books, unless you follow the method in which you have translated Job, viz., with the addition of notes, to let it be seen plainly what differences there are between this version of yours and that of the Septuagint, whose authority is worthy of highest esteem.”
Augustine’s concern was prescient. Jerome’s “sense for sense” approach, while defensible in principle, leaves room for interpretive importation—precisely what we observe in his variable treatment of δικαιοσύνη.
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The introduction of aequitas for δικαιοσύνη is a translational error—not of incompetence, but of overconfidence. Jerome believed he understood the text well enough to improve upon its vocabulary. In this, he was mistaken. /21
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The Latin reader of the Vulgate receives a text subtly but significantly deformed from its Greek original—deformed in ways that would shape Western theological and legal thinking for over a millennium. /22
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The chain from Jerome to the philosophes is quite unbroken. From the original latin aequitas, the French language broke into two derivatives: /23
For over a millennium, the Vulgate was the primary text of Western Christendom. “The modern term ‘equity’ originally comes to us from the Old French term, équité, which in turn came from the original Latin, aequitatem, a word that could mean a number of different things, including equality, fairness, uniformity, or even symmetry.”
By the late medieval period, aequitas had split into two French derivatives:
• Équité (from aequitas): fairness, equity
• Égalité (from aequalitas): equality, sameness
“Their ultimate source, and that of their many relatives in English, is the Latin adjective aequus (level, even, just).”
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Rosseau intentionally rejected the theological structure of iustitia and instead his movement adopted a horizontal symmetric equals contractual system. ‘inherent rights’ that depend only upon one’s human existence. Complete inversion of God’s stated testament to man. /24
“The philosophes were the intellectuals of the 18th-century European Enlightenment. Few were primarily philosophers; rather, philosophes were public intellectuals who applied reason to the study of many areas of learning, including philosophy, history, science, politics, economics, and social issues.”
“The philosophes wanted freedom of the press and freedom of religion, which they considered ‘natural rights’ guaranteed by ‘natural law.’”
Their core vocabulary included:
• Liberté (liberty)
• Égalité (equality)
• Fraternité (fraternity)
• Raison (reason)
• Droits naturels (natural rights)
B. The Pivotal Concept: Égalité
Here is the critical observation: “Liberté, égalité, fraternité (French for ‘liberty, equality, fraternity’, Latin: Libertas, aequalitas, fraternitas) became the defining motto of the Enlightenment project and the French Revolution.”
The French égalité descends from Latin aequalitas, which itself derives from the same root (aequus) as aequitas. “Equity and equality share the same ultimate Latin root, but they split the meaning down the middle… The root word that they share is aequus (pronounced EYE-kwus), meaning ‘even’ or ‘fair’ or ‘equal.’ That word led to the direct antecedents of our English words: equity is from the Latin aequitas, and equality is from aequalitas.”
C. How Aequitas / Égalité Displaced Iustitia / Δικαιοσύνη
The philosophes explicitly rejected the traditional theological framework within which δικαιοσύνη/iustitia had operated. “Rousseau, in his Social Contract of 1762, took the ideas of Montesquieu and also Locke a step further; he argued that all government rested on a social contract (not on divine right, not the Bible, not tradition of any kind) in which ‘the assembled people’ (democracy) determined everything.”
“For him, ‘the person of the meanest citizen is as sacred and inviolable as that of the first magistrate’; in other words, Rousseau insisted on complete equality (between men).”
A. From Testamentary Benefaction to Horizontal Contract
The Greek LXX presented a vertical structure:
• A great Benefactor makes a διαθήκη (disposition)
• The beneficiary receives δικαιοσύνη (right standing) through πίστις (trust)
• The relationship is asymmetric: giver and receiver, not equals negotiating terms
The Enlightenment framework substituted a horizontal structure:
• Autonomous individuals enter a “social contract”
• They possess “natural rights” inherently, not by bestowal
• The relationship is symmetric: equals contracting with equals
“During the Enlightenment, the concept of natural laws was used to challenge the divine right of kings and became an alternative justification for the establishment of a social contract, positive law, and government or legal rights.”
B. From Righteousness to Equality
The Greek δικαιοσύνη denoted:
• A virtue (settled excellence of character)
• Right standing before a Benefactor
• Integrity in fulfilling one’s disposition
• Something that could be reckoned/credited to a person
The Enlightenment égalité denoted:
• A condition (sameness of status)
• Undifferentiated horizontal relation among citizens
• Absence of hierarchy or vertical dependence
• Something inherent rather than bestowed
“Most Enlightenment scientists believed that all humans everywhere have the ability to reason for themselves and form their own societies. They also believed that all humans are entitled to certain basic rights that they called natural rights.”
C. From Received Gift to Inherent Possession
In the testamentary Greek framework:
• δικαιοσύνη is received from the Benefactor
• It is credited to those who trust
• It depends on the character and faithfulness of the Testator
In the Enlightenment framework:
• Rights are inherent (“natural,” “inalienable”)
• They require no bestowal, no benefactor
• They depend on nothing but one’s existence as a human being
“The idea of natural rights is the concept used in philosophy and legal studies that a person has certain rights from birth and which, because they were not awarded by a particular state or legal authority, cannot be removed, that is, they are inalienable.”
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Jerome was the bridge to the rejection of God’s authority over man. “Equity is to justice as cause is to its effect, or that justice cannot be anything else than declared equity.” – Diderot. /25
Jerome’s occasional rendering of δικαιοσύνη as aequitas created a semantic bridge that later thinkers could exploit. When the Vulgate itself suggested that “divine righteousness” could be expressed as “equity”—as evenness, balance, fairness—it opened the door for a secularizing reduction.
If δικαιοσύνη = aequitas = “levelness, fairness, balance,” then:
• The vertical testamentary structure can be flattened into horizontal fairness
• The Benefactor’s “righteousness” becomes mere “fair dealing”
• The heir’s “right standing” becomes mere “equal treatment”
B. Montesquieu’s Use of Équité
Montesquieu, arguably the most influential of the philosophes for political theory, employed the language of equity throughout L’Esprit des Lois (1748). “No labor is so heavy but it may be brought to a level with the workman’s strength, when regulated by equity, and not by avarice.”
“There were laws of justice and equity before the establishment of positive laws; hence also he has proved that all beings had laws; that even before their creation they had possible laws; and that God himself had laws, that is, the laws which he himself had made.”
This is the secularized aequitas—a natural, cosmic principle of balance and fairness, prior to any divine revelation or testamentary disposition. It requires no Benefactor, no διαθήκη, no bestowal. It simply is.
C. Diderot and the Encyclopédie
In Diderot’s influential article “Droit naturel” in the Encyclopédie, we find the explicit connection between equity and justice in the new framework:
“Equity is to justice as cause is to its effect, or that justice cannot be anything else than declared equity.”
This is a remarkable inversion. In the Greek–Aristotelian framework, δικαιοσύνη (justice as virtue) was primary, and ἐπιείκεια (equity as corrective) was secondary—the adjustment of strict law to particular circumstances.
Diderot reverses this: équité is now the cause, and justice is merely its effect. The procedural concept of fairness has displaced the characterological concept of righteousness. Jerome’s aequitas has triumphed over δικαιοσύνη.
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This led directly to the modern humanists: /26
“In contemporary usage, humanism as a philosophy refers to a non-theistic view centered on human agency, and a reliance only on science and reason rather than revelation from a divine source to understand the world.”
“The secular humanist recognizes the central role of morality in human life; indeed, ethics was developed as a branch of human knowledge long before religionists proclaimed their moral systems based upon divine authority.”
This is the end-point of the conceptual genealogy: a system of ethics and rights that explicitly rejects any “divine authority” as its source, grounding justice instead in “human experience” and “reason.”
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By rendering δικαιοσύνη as aequitas in judicial contexts, Jerome opened a door. Through that door, aequitas gradually displaced iustitia as the governing concept of “natural” or “inherent” right relation among persons. /27
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The philosophes sought a secular principle of justice. They found équité/égalité ready-made: horizontal, procedural, natural, self-evident. The philosophes constructed a humanism of horizontal equality among autonomous individuals who possess rights by nature. /28
The AI Assessment (ChatGPT)
The argument is tightly constructed in its rhetoric, but it depends on several key connections that are either overstated, selectively supported, or unstable when examined closely; the following proceeds from the overall structure down to specific points.
At the broadest level, the central claim—that Jerome’s occasional use of aequitas for δικαιοσύνη created a causal path to Enlightenment égalité—is not actually demonstrated but asserted; the reasoning moves from word choice → meaning shift → conceptual framework → intellectual history without showing clear historical links at each stage (for example, there is no evidence that Rousseau, Diderot, or Montesquieu were working from Vulgate vocabulary rather than from Roman law, medieval natural law, or early modern political conditions), so the argument is based on resemblance rather than documented transmission; the additional claim in the text that the Septuagint translators were “inspired” functions not as historical evidence but as a theological assumption, and unless that assumption is independently established and integrated into the method, it cannot serve as proof in a linguistic or historical argument about how meanings develop across languages.
On Greek terminology, the treatment of δικαιοσύνη is largely accurate within classical philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics), but it assumes that this philosophical meaning controls how the word would be understood in the Septuagintal Greek tradition; the claim that a Greek reader would interpret δικαιοσύνη strictly through Platonic or Aristotelian categories is too rigid, because Hellenistic Jewish Greek clearly adapts and reshapes meanings (as also happens with words like νόμος, χάρις, and πίστις), so the assumption that the meaning remains fixed from secular Greek into this Greek biblical tradition is questionable, whether or not one believes the translators were inspired.
In addition, the argument treats “the LXX” as if it were a single, fixed textual standard from which Jerome deviated, but the historical situation is more complex; by Jerome’s time, the Greek Old Testament existed in multiple forms and revisions (including Hexaplaric and other mixed traditions), so what counted as “the Greek text” was not uniform, and Jerome’s engagement with it was shaped by this textual plurality rather than a clearly defined, stable baseline.
The discussion of ἐλεημοσύνη is partly correct, especially in noting its shift toward concrete acts such as almsgiving, but the numerical claim about how often it appears is likely inaccurate, and the broader claim—that the Greek Old Testament introduces a “doing righteousness” idea foreign to Greek—is overstated, since Greek can and does use verbs like ποιεῖν (“to do”) with abstract nouns, even if that is less typical in philosophical writing.
The most significant philological problem concerns διαθήκη: it is true that in secular Greek the word often means “will” or “testament,” but the claim that there is “no word for covenant in the inspired Greek Old Testament” is incorrect as stated; instead, the translators deliberately used διαθήκη to represent the Hebrew concept of covenant, thereby expanding its meaning; this is a known case of semantic extension, not proof that Greek readers would automatically interpret it in a strictly testamentary sense, and the reconstruction of how a Greek reader “would naturally understand it” ignores the surrounding narrative and religious context, which would shape interpretation; this remains true even if one holds that the translation is inspired, since inspiration does not prevent words from taking on expanded meanings.
Closely related to this, the proposed “testamentary framework” applied to Genesis 15:6 is interpretive rather than required by the language itself; while λογίζομαι does carry an accounting sense, the conclusion that a Greek reader would think in terms of inheritance law and “worthy heirs” is speculative, since the passage itself does not introduce inheritance terminology such as κληρονομία.
Regarding Latin, the main claim—that aequitas corresponds to ἐπιείκεια and iustitia to δικαιοσύνη—is broadly correct in classical philosophical discussions, but it is overstated as an absolute rule; Latin usage is more flexible, and aequitas can overlap with broader ideas of justice, especially outside strict philosophical contexts, so describing it as merely procedural and not a virtue is too narrow given how authors like Cicero and later jurists use the term.
The most serious factual issue is the repeated claim that Jerome systematically replaced δικαιοσύνη with aequitas; in reality, the Vulgate overwhelmingly translates δικαιοσύνη as iustitia, not aequitas, and the argument depends on treating occasional variation as if it were a consistent translation policy without demonstrating that this is actually the case.
The example of Proverbs 1:3 (comparing the Septuagintal Greek tradition and the Vulgate) is correctly observed in that Jerome expands the list of terms, but the conclusion that this reflects a doctrinal or ideological change is not proven; given the textual plurality of the Greek Old Testament in Jerome’s time, such differences do not necessarily represent a clear departure from a single standard text, and expansions of this kind are common in Jerome’s work and can reflect normal translation style rather than a shift in underlying concepts.
The claim that ἐπιείκεια is “never used where δικαιοσύνη appears” is too absolute; even if generally true within the Greek Old Testament tradition, it does not follow that the concepts are so rigidly separated that any variation in Latin translation would constitute a fundamental error, since translation between languages does not require exact one-to-one word matching.
From a historical standpoint, the jump from the Vulgate to Enlightenment ideas of equality is the weakest part of the argument; although the words share a common root (aequus), a shared origin does not establish a causal relationship, and Enlightenment concepts of equality arise more directly from Roman law (aequalitas), Christian natural law traditions, and specific political developments, not from reinterpretations of biblical aequitas; the proposed chain from aequitas to French équité/égalité to Rousseau is linguistically true but historically unproven. The claim that Enlightenment thinkers replaced iustitia with aequitas is also inaccurate; their central terms are aequalitas, ius naturale, and social contract theory, which cannot be reduced to Jerome’s translation choices.
Finally, the appeal to the inspiration of the Septuagint translators does not solve these problems; instead, it shifts the argument into a theological framework that would need to be established separately before it could be used to support claims about language, translation, and intellectual history. Taken as a whole, the argument rests on a premise that is not adequately established and on a chain of connections that are, at best, tenuous, making the overall case weak despite its rhetorical coherence.